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Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm
Congressional Elections
Joseph Bafumi Dartmouth College
Robert S. Erikson Columbia University
Christopher Wlezien Temple University
One mystery of U.S. politics is why the president’s party regularly loses congressional seats at midterm. Although
presidential coattails and their withdrawal provide a partial explanation, coattails cannot account for the fact that the
presidential party typically performs worse than normal at midterm. This paper addresses the midterm vote separate
from the presidential year vote, with evidence from generic congressional polls conducted during midterm election years.
Polls early in the midterm year project a normal vote result in November. But as the campaign progresses, vote
preferences almost always move toward the out party. This shift is not a negative referendum on the president, as
midterms do not show a pattern of declining presidential popularity or increasing salience of presidential performance.
The shift accords with ‘‘balance’’ theory, where the midterm campaign motivates some to vote against the party of the
president in order to achieve policy moderation.

O

ne running mystery about American politics
is that the winning presidential party almost
always loses congressional seats at the next
midterm election. For a run of 15 straight midterm
elections, 1938–94, the presidential party suffered seat
losses at midterm. In 1998, Clinton’s Democrats gained
seats but did actually suffer a slight decline in its share
of the national vote. Bush’s Republicans triumphantly
won both seats and vote share in 2002, but of course
not in 2006.
At one time the prevailing explanation for midterm loss was Campbell’s (1966) ‘‘surge-and- decline’’
theory. Surge-and-decline dictates the winning presidential party’s congressional support surges in
response to ‘‘short-term partisan forces’’ in the
‘‘high-stimulus’’ presidential year. These waxing forces
(or presidential ‘‘coattails’’) then wane in the following midterm election as the outcome returns to the
‘‘normal’’ (largely party-line) vote with the president
no longer on the ballot and the related ‘‘low-stimulus’’
status of the midterm campaign.1
It is true, of course, that congressional parties
perform better in presidential years when the party’s

presidential candidate does well. This is the coattail
phenomenon. However the prediction of a persistent
normal vote at midterm is clearly wrong. More importantly, the presidential party’s disadvantage at
midterm typically outweighs its advantage in the previous presidential year. Figure 1 presents the accounting for the 16 post-WWII midterm cycles. The first
panel shows the pattern of vote change from presidential year to midterm year. The second panel shows
that in presidential years, each party typically earns
2.6 percentage points more of the House vote when
it wins the presidency than when it loses. This is the
yield from coattails. The third panel shows that, for
midterms, each party typically earns 4.1 percentage
points more when out of power than when it holds the
presidency. (Both regularities pass the test of statistical
significance.) To do well in midterm House elections,
it is best to lose the presidency. Surge-and-decline
theories do not fully account for why this is true.
‘‘Referendum theory’’ is often cited as a reason
for the presidential party’s poor midterm showing.
Presidents decline in popularity from their initial
honeymoon period, and the degree of popularity can

1

Campbell (1997) has a good accounting of traditional surge-and-decline and coattail theories.
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F IGURE 1 Midterm Loss as the Subtraction of the Presidential Year Vote from the Midterm Year Vote,
1944–46—2004–06

matter at midterm (Campbell 1997; Jacobson 2004;
Tufte 1975).2 But referendum theory has one weak
link if it is to explain the midterm slump. As detailed
below, presidents’ approval levels are not particularly
low at midterm compared to other non-honeymoon
periods. With majorities typically ‘‘approving’’ the
president’s performance at midterm, it is difficult to
claim that the presidential party’s typical poor showing in midterm elections is due to voter disillusionment with how the president is handling the job.
This leads to still a third way of accounting for
midterm loss, so-called ‘‘balance’’ theory. In the
formulation of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995; see also
Fiorina 2003), the electorate boosts its support for the
out party at midterm from a desire for balance in
terms of ideology or policy. Policy is seen as the result
of the averaged party composition of Congress and
the presidency. While both parties sit in Congress, the
presidency is not divisible by party. Thus, net policy
must be right of the median voter during Republican
administrations and to the left during Democratic
administrations. By putting their collective thumbs
on the scale in favor of the out party at midterm,
voters move policy back toward the center. Sentiments toward balancing emerge and grow as campaigns focus voters on their vote decisions.
‘‘Balancing’’ theory has its own issues. Most
obviously, the theory lost some luster when it failed
2

James Campbell (1997) offers a revised surge-and-decline theory
to account for change in terms of the traditional presidential year
surge but with a midterm vote that is not necessarily the ‘‘low
stimulus’’ result predicted by Angus Campbell’s original version.

to predict the gaining party in the 1998 and 2002
midterm elections. The theory must reckon with the
corollary that voters might sometimes balance in
advance—in presidential years when landslide victories are universally anticipated (Scheve and Tomz
1999). Anticipatory balancing could minimize midterm loss by offsetting coattail effects.
Some see ideological balancing as beyond the
capability of the electorate. This criticism may have
bite when applied to ‘‘thick’’ balance theories, such as
Mebane’s (2000) complex model of the midterm vote
as an N-person game involving voter coordination. A
‘‘thin’’ version requires only that voters are motivated
by a perceived policy difference between the parties,
plus a knowledge of the president’s party.3
The present paper addresses that portion of
midterm loss generated during the midterm year.
3

Variations of these theories deserve mention. Jacobson and
Kernell’s (1983) ‘‘strategic politicians’’ theory posits that congressional election outcomes are in large part generated by politicians
anticipating electoral trends and capitalizing on them. For
instance, if the midterm year is seen as a good year for the out
party, the out party can draw strong challengers. In the extreme,
the politicians’ beliefs about the political climate generate a selffulfilling prophesy. Strategic politicians theory is best seen as a
complement to existing theories—as a reminder that electoral
trends driven by referendum or balance processes can accelerate
when the politicians believe them to be true.
Kernell (1977) also introduces a ‘‘negative voting’’ model. He
posits that out-party supporters are more motivated to vote. This
sort of asymmetrical motivation could complement either referendum theory or balance theory. By either scenario, abstentions
by presidential supporters would produce a result similar to that
from voters shifting their votes toward the out party. A question
would be why there would be this asymmetric motivation to vote
at midterm but not on other electoral occasions.

balancing in congressional midterms
We make use of a unique data set—the results of
national polls predicting the congressional vote in
midterm years using the ‘‘generic ballot’’ question,
which asks respondents for which party (not candidate) they intend to vote. We have measured generic
ballot responses for six separate time periods in the
campaign calendar over all 16 midterm election years,
1946–2006. Our central question is whether generic
ballot respondents increasingly take the party of the
president into account over the course of midterm
campaigns. Decisively, we find that they do. We then
address whether the reason for increasing motivation
to vote for the ‘‘out’’ party at midterm year is due to
growing dissatisfaction with the president’s performance. We find that it is not. As citizens focus more on
their vote decision in the run-up to the election, they
increasingly balance against the president’s party but
not in a way that is traceable to their perceptions of
presidential performance.

Balancing Theory and Midterm
Electorates
The theoretical argument for balancing in midterm
elections is presented by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).4
The conditions for the balancing argument to hold are
that some voters are motivated to move policy closer to
their desired policy position and that these voters hold
beliefs about the relevant policy positions that separate
the parties. Given the usual choice between a liberal
Democrat and a conservative Republican, the president
will advocate policy to the left (if Democrat) or right (if
Republican) of most voters. Congress, a blend of 535
individually elected representatives will on average be
closer to national public opinion than will the president. Thus, conditional on knowing the presidential
party, the electorate can push policy toward the center
by voting for the opposition party.5
Figure 2 illustrates, using data from the 2006
CCES poll plus congressional roll-call data, with
voters and politicians scaled on a common metric
from Bafumi and Herron (2007). President Bush is to
the right of most voters. The pre-election 109th
4
Note that Alesina and Rosenthal’s balance theory is about voting
for one office based on the national verdict in the other. It is not
about split-ticket voting, as if voters choose from a menu of
candidates for various offices based on ideological balance.

707
Congress under Republican control was to the right
of the median voter. Following the election of a
Democratic House, the 110th Congress was slightly to
the left of the median voter. The 2006 election generated an ideological correction (consistent with
balance theory) but also a predictably modest one.
If we imagine where voters saw actual policy on the
left-right scale before the election, it would be perhaps halfway between the president’s position and
that of the Republican Congress, considerably to the
right of the median voter. We then imagine a postelection policy shift to the left (halfway between the
110th Congress and President Bush), but still somewhat to the right of the median.
Two factors restrict the dynamism of the model.
First, presumably only a small subset of voters
decides by strategic balancing based on policy considerations. This is quite different from what the
world would be like if everybody did. Second, given
the checks and balances of the U.S. system, policy
change occurs slowly, not instantaneously following a
change of elected personnel. For instance, policy
presumably moved farther right under six years of
Republican control than it did in the two years of
divided rule that followed the 2006 election. Even
after the 2008 election brought a Democratic president and strengthened Democratic congressional
majorities, policy would not immediately move as
far to the left as it was to the right before the election.
It would move from the status quo toward the midpoint between presidential and Congressional position, but with a considerable lag. Thus the degree of
imbalance at any one time is not between the median
voter and the congressional-presidential midpoint,
but between the median voter and the slower moving
net policy, averaged across issues.6
An implication of these restrictions on the dynamism of the model is that balancing behavior can reflect not only the current party balance at midterm but
also party balance from the past. Thus, for instance,
the 2010 midterm electorate will balance not only
Obama’s liberalism but also the conservative policies
inherited from the Bush years. If there is also a Democratic president and Congress in place for the 2014
midterm, policy would reflect six years of Democratic
dominance and policy shifting further left. The balancing imperative would be a stronger Republican tilt
at the 2014 midterm. This would be a manifestation of
the ‘‘six year itch’’ (Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth

5

Ample research shows that presidents’ policy behavior provides
voters a clear motivation for balancing, as the party of the president is a strong predictor of policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002; Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Wlezien 2004).

6

For a discussion of why national policy responds slowly to
public opinion, see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002).
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F IGURE 2 The Ideological Positions of the House, President and Voters on a Common Scale. Ideal points
based on roll call data and CCES survey interviews. House ideal points represent the median
member.
Bush
Median Voter
110th House 109th House

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Ideological Position

Source: Adopted from Bafumi and Herron, “Preference Aggregation, Representation, and
Elected American Political Institutions.” Unpublished Manuscript.

1986), the tendency of a party to lose more seats after
six years in office than after only two.

Generic Polls of the Congressional
Vote
Going back to 1946, pollsters (initially Gallup alone)
have monitored the ‘‘generic vote’’ during midterm
campaigns. Generic trial-heat polls ask survey
respondents which party they plan to vote for (or
who they want to win) in the upcoming congressional election.7 We have gathered the record of 831
generic congressional polls in midterm elections years
beginning in 1946, from Gallup and other survey
organizations, using the Roper Center and pollingreport.com as sources. We measure the generic vote
at several intervals leading up to the midterm election
date. The earliest feasible reading is for early in the
midterm year—241 to 300 days before the election,
centering on February of the midterm year. We also
measure the generic vote during later intervals—181
to 240 days, 121 to 180 days, 61–120 days, 31–60
days, and 1–30 days before the election. Based on the
7
There is considerable variation in question wording. Some
organizations ask ‘‘If the election were being held today.’’ Other
organizations use ‘‘Looking ahead to the congressional elections
in November’’ or ‘‘Thinking about the next election for U.S.
Congress.’’ Given what we know about wording effects on
presidential trial-heats (Lau 1994), there is reason to think that
the exact wording matters little, though there may be circumstances where they are consequential (see, e.g., McDermott and
Frankovic 2003).

modal month for each interval, we describe the
interval midpoints as February, April, June, August,
September, and October. For each interval in each of
16 midterm years we pool the available poll readings
as described in the online appendix available at
http://journals.cambridge.org/jop.8
We measure both the actual vote and the verdicts
in the generic congressional polls as percentages of the
two-party vote. To aid assessment of possible (partisan) poll bias, we measure the vote and the surveybased generic vote as a deviation from the equal
division, 50% Democratic and 50% Republican. Pollsters variously report the generic vote as among ‘‘likely
voters,’’ ‘‘registered voters,’’ or ‘‘adults.’’ For the
analysis, we adjust the observed poll results to project
our best estimates of what the result would be if the
poll were a ‘‘likely voter’’ poll. Details are available in
the online appendix.
The answer to the question ‘‘how accurate are
the generic polls?’’ must be nuanced (Erikson and
Sigelman 1995; Moore and Saad 1997). Generic polls
perform poorly as point estimates; the leading party
in the polls typically ends up with a smaller lead on
Election Day. However, regression equations accounting for the vote in terms of the generic vote do
predict well, as they properly discount the exaggerated sizes of the generic poll leads. When properly
interpreted, the generic polls are far better augers of
congressional elections than their sometimes ragged
reputation would have us believe.
8

The online appendix is also available at www.dartmouth.edu/
~jbafumi.

balancing in congressional midterms
T ABLE 1
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FEBRUARY POLLS. Predicting the Generic Vote in February Polls, 16 Midterm Years 1946–2006
Dependent Variable 5 February Generic Poll
Results (% Dem. minus 50%)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Party Identification in February
0.72 (0.08)***
0.71 (0.08)***
0.66 (0.09)***
0.72 (0.08)***
0.66 (0.11)***
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Lagged Presidential Party
22.31 (0.53)*** 22.35 (0.54)*** 22.14 (0.52)** 22.49 (0.59)*** 22.14 (0.77)*
(1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Current Presidential Party
0.27 (0.57)
20.24 (1.08)
(1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Lagged Congressional Vote
0.33 (0.25)
0.36 (0.34)
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Lagged Presidential Vote
0.07 (0.10)
0.02 (0.21)
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Intercept
0.74 (0.88)
0.88 (0.95)
0.50 (0.88)
0.80 (0.91)
0.38 (1.08)
Adjusted R squared
.88
.87
.89
.87
.87
RMSE
2.08
2.15
2.03
2.13
2.21
Note: ‘‘February’’ polls actually represent polls from 241 to 300 days in advance of the election. Generic poll results and all vote variables
are measured as the Democratic percent of the two-party vote minus 50 percent. Party identification is measured as the Democratic
percent of Democratic or Republican partisans, minus 50 percent.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001

We also employ monthly readings of party
identification (or ‘‘macropartisanship’’) and of presidential approval. Macropartisanship is a useful measure of underlying partisan sentiment. Similar to our
generic vote measure, we measure party identification
as the percent Democratic among Democratic and
Republican identifiers, relative to the 50–50 baseline.9
Presidential approval is measured in the conventional
way, as the percent who say they ‘‘approve’’ of the
current president’s performance.10
Given that ‘‘monthly’’ data for generic polls, party
identification, and presidential approval are often
drawn from the same surveys, there must be considerable overlap in the respondents comprising the three
aggregate measures. This is an advantage, not a handicap. Overlapping respondents provides leverage; relationships among different survey-based aggregate
variables are more accurate if they are measured for
the same rather than different samples of respondents.

9

Interestingly, unlike with the generic vote, there is no effect on
party identification of being in or out of power at midterm. The
mean October macropartisanship is exactly 58.3% Democratic
for both the seven midterms with a Democratic president and the
nine midterms with a Republican president.
10
Both party identification and presidential approval are measured for the exact designated month rather than the larger time
bands required to measure the generic vote at six waves. Where
monthly data are missing, the reading is interpolated from the
readings for surrounding months.

Ideological Balancing and the
Midterm Campaign
It is widely agreed that the function of election
campaigns is to bring the issues of the campaign to
the voters. In midterm election years, the presidential
opposition party tries to prime voters that they
should elect more of its members in order to restore
partisan balance in Washington. In this section we
demonstrate that this strategy almost universally
works to change congressional vote preferences over
the midterm year.

The Presidential Party and Generic Ballot
Trial Heats
We begin with the mapping of the generic congressional vote in February of the midterm year, the
earliest milepost for which we can get readings for all
16 midterm years of our analysis. By this time point
of the campaign, any coattail effects from the previous presidential election should have dissipated.
From surge and decline theory, we expect a reversion
to the ‘‘normal vote,’’ a set of vote margins that
follow closely from the national division of party
identification at the time. We also expect that nine
months before the election, survey respondents are
not yet thinking strategically to take into account the
presidential party and its policy implications.
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As Table 1 shows, this is what we find but with
one twist: in February of the midterm year, survey
respondents balance the incumbent president from
the previous term. We see this from equation (1),
where party identification and the presidential party
from the prior term account for almost 90% of the
variance in the generic vote. The prediction is
roughly that the Democratic lead in the vote division
using the generic ballot will be about three-quarters
of the Democratic lead in party identification, modified a bit more than 2 added points either way to the
party that was out of power the previous presidential
term. An effect of the previous presidential party is
difficult to challenge since even with only 16 cases it
is statistically significant at the .001 level.
Other plausible variables for predicting voter
choice offer no contribution to predicting the February
generic vote once our two contributing variables are
in the equation. Equation (2) shows that the current
presidential party does not yet have an impact. Nor, as
equations (3) and (4) show, does the lagged congressional vote or the vote for president from the previous presidential year. Equation (5) shows that these
variables collectively do not matter. Importantly, the

T ABLE 2

lack of a presidential vote effect suggests that coattails
from the previous election are withdrawn as of early
in the next campaign. If coattail voting were to persist when the presidential race no longer shares the
ticket, coattail withdrawal could not account for midterm loss.
The generic vote in February presents only the
baseline starting point. In February, survey respondents are asked to reveal their hypothetical votes for
Congress at a time when they have given little
thought to the matter. We will see next that as the
campaign progresses, the party of the president
increasingly affects the generic vote. The equations
are shown in Table 2.
Table 2’s equations predict the generic vote from
current partisanship plus the lagged and current
presidential party at six time points of the campaign.
Party identification in later months predicts the
generic vote similarly to what we observe in February.
The previous presidential party continues to matter,
although fading in importance. Now the current
presidential party begins to affect elections, first
emerging with a statistically significant effect (.05) in
August. By September and again in October, the

THE GENERIC VOTE AT VARIOUS STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN. Predicting Generic Ballot
Poll Results at Different Time Intervals from Party Identification and the Presidential Party, 16
midterm elections, 1946–2006.
Dependent Variable 5 Generic Poll Results (% Dem. minus 50%)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
241–300
181–240
121–180
61–120
31–60
1–30
Election
Days
Days
Days
Days
Days
Days
Day
Out (Feb.) Out (April) Out (June) Out (August) Out (Sept.) Out (Oct.) Vote (Nov.)

Party Identification
(% Dem. minus
50%)
Lagged Presidential
Party
(1 5 D, 21 5 R)
Current Presidential
Party
(1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Intercept
Adj. R2
Root MSE

0.71
(0.08)***
22.35
(0.54)***

0.77
(0.12)***

0.91
(0.09)***

0.86
(0.10)***

0.83
(0.06)***

0.73
(0.06)***

0.39
(0.07)***

21.15
(0.66)

20.93
(0.47)

21.78
(0.53)**

22.25
(0.37)***

21.57
(0.36)***

21.25
(0.40)**

0.27
(0.57)

20.07
(0.66)

20.64
(0.48)

21.62
(0.55)*

21.90
(0.38)***

21.56
(0.36)***

21.89
(0.40)***

0.88
(0.95)
.87
2.15

0.55
(1.16)
.77
2.56

20.46
(0.86)
.88
1.86

20.84
(1.02)
.85
2.12

21.59
(0.64)*
.93
1.49

21.04
(0.70)
.93
1.43

21.04
(0.70)
.82
1.59

Note: Generic poll results are measured as the Democratic percent of the two-party vote minus 50 percent. Party identification is
measured as the Democratic percent of Democratic or Republican partisans, minus 50 percent. Party identification is measured for the
indicated month except that for predicting the actual vote, party i.d. in October (rather than November) is used. Equation 6 is a repeat
of equation 2 from Table 1.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001

balancing in congressional midterms
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current party coefficient is significant at the .001 level.
Clearly, by the Fall, voters begin to gravitate away
from the presidential party when asked by pollsters.
The size of this ‘‘current presidential party’’ effect
on the generic polls, while highly significant, may not
seem like much in magnitude—just above 1.5% of
the vote. With the presidential party dummy scaled as
+1 (Democrat) or 21 (Republican), this translates
into a net 3-point (or more) differential in terms of
the difference between the president being a Democrat or a Republican. Equation (12) shows that for
the actual vote, the estimated effect of the current
presidential party is 1.89 percentage points, for almost a 4-point differential. The lagged presidential
party continues to matter as well.
Our interpretation is that midterm voters respond negatively to the continuation of the policy
direction inherited from the previous president and
learn to respond negatively to the policy direction
under the current president. If the current presidential party also held the presidency during the previous
term, the two penalties add together. If the current
president party has held the office for only two years,
the lagged presidential penalty is subtracted from the

T ABLE 3

current presidential penalty. The result is that when a
president is freshly elected, his party’s vote support
declines over the midterm campaign from a slight
advantage over what party identification alone would
bring to a slight disadvantage on Election Day. When
a presidential party has been in power for six years or
longer, however, the party starts with a disadvantage
that grows larger over the campaign. This helps
explain the variation in midterm loss over time.

The Presidential Party, Generic Ballots, and
the Midterm Election Outcome
Table 3 returns to the February generic poll results,
this time as an independent variable accounting for
the actual November vote. The task is to predict the
November vote from information available in February. Equation (13) shows the ‘‘best’’ equation with
two variables accounting for almost 80% of the
variance in the vote: the February generic ballot
results plus the current presidential party. No other
information matters—not February party identification, not the lagged congressional vote, not the lagged
presidential vote, and not the lagged presidential

FROM FEBRUARY TO ELECTION DAY. Predicting the Midterm Congressional Vote from
Generic Vote in February Polls plus other Variables, 16 midterm Years 1946–2006.
Dependent Variable 5 Democratic % of Actual
Two–Party Vote in November, minus 50%

February Generic
Poll Results (% Dem.
minus 50%)
Party Identification in
February (% Dem.
minus 50%)
Lagged Presidential
Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Current Presidential Party
(1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Lagged Congressional Vote
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Lagged Presidential Vote
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Intercept
Adjusted R squared
RMSE

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

0.44 (0.08)***

0.37 (0.15)*

0.41 (0.10)***

0.42 (0.09)***

0.42 (0.09)***

0.08 (0.13)

20.28 (0.50)
22.65 (0.45)***

22.70 (0.46)***

22.80 (0.54)***

22.58 (0.47)***

22.83 (0.83)*

0.15 (0.27)
20.07 (0.14)
21.26 (0.72)
.78
1.72

21.42 (0.79)
.77
1.77

21.39 (0.78)
.77
1.77

21.05 (1.62)
.77
1.77

21.13 (0.80)
.77
1.77

Note: ‘‘February’’ polls actually represent polls from 241 to 300 days in advance of the election. Generic poll results and all vote variables
are measured as the Democratic percent of the two-party vote minus 50 percent. Party identification is measured as the Democratic
percent of Democratic or Republican partisans, minus 50 percent.
*p , .05.**p , .01,***p , .001.
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CAMPAIGN DYNAMICS OVER VARYING TIME INTERVALS. Predicting Midterm
Congressional Vote from the Generic Ballot Poll Results at different times plus Presidential
Party, 16 midterm elections 1946–2006.
Dependent Variable 5 Democratic % of Actual
Two–Party Vote in November, minus 50%
(18)
(19)
(20)
241–300 Days 181–240 Days 121–180 Days
Out (Feb.)
Out (April)
Out (June)

(21)
61–120 Days
Out (August)

(22)
31–60 Days
Out (Sept.)

(23)
1–30 Days
Out (Oct.)

Generic Poll Results 0.44*** (0.08) 0.48*** (0.09) 0.48*** (0.09) 0.47*** (0.09) 0.47*** (0.07) 0.52*** (0.10)
(% Dem. minus
50%)
Current Presidential 22.65*** (0.45) 22.29*** (0.46) 22.07*** (0.48) 21.60** (0.46) 21.45** (0.42) 21.15* (0.49)
Party (R 5 21,
D 5 +1)
Intercept
21.26 (0.72)
21.10 (0.75)
21.00 (0.78)
20.91 (0.71)
20.31 (0.56)
0.05 (0.61)
Adj. R2
.78
.76
.74
.76
.81
.75
Root MSE
1.72
1.82
1.89
1.80
1.61
1.84
Note: Generic poll results and the vote are measured as the Democratic percent of the two-party vote minus 50 percent. Equation 18 is a
repeat of equation 13 in Table 3.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001

party (which, like party identification, is incorporated
in the February generic vote).
Of central interest from equation (13) is the
highly significant (.001) coefficient for the current
presidential party. It indicates that which party holds
the presidency makes a difference of over 5 percentage points (22.65 3 2) beyond the prediction from
the generic polls in February. This differential represents the effect of the campaign between February
and November. Statistically, the predictive power of
the presidential party is equivalent to that of the
February generic polls when measured by the difference in t-values (25.95 vs. 5.94) or the difference in
standardized ‘‘beta’’ coefficients (20.73 vs. 0.71). To
predict the November vote in February, the party of
the president is at least as important as the generic
polls. And, as equations (14–17) show, to know only
the president’s party and generic poll results means
that other indicators—including party identification
and electoral history—are of little use.
As estimated, the out party gains 5.3 percentage
points (2.65 times 2) from February to November. Since
on average a party is only 4.2 percentage points better
off at midterm when it does not hold the presidency,
our estimate overshoots the net out-party advantage.
The gap is made up by the fact that in February the out
party is disadvantaged by 1.2 percentage points. (This
estimate is obtained by predicting the expected twoparty vote based on February polls but subtracting out
the 22.65 presidential party effect from equation 13.)
The next task is to model the vote as a function of the

presidential party plus the generic polls at various time
points between February and November.
Table 4 takes this next step. Equations (18–23)
predict the November congressional vote from the
generic polls plus presidential party at each of the six
measured mileposts. They present strong and stable
fits with the data. No matter when in the campaign
the generic ballot results are measured, more than
three-quarters of the variance in the vote can be
explained. This stability suggests that partisan preferences are firmly in place by the onset of the
midterm year and captured by the generic polls.11
The equations’ intercepts are consistently small and
nonsignificant, an indication that the generic polls
contain no persistent partisan bias. The coefficients
for the generic poll division do not change with the
time of the poll—hovering in the very narrow range
between 0.46 and 0.51. Leads at any point in time are
effectively halved by Election Day, ceteris paribus.
Our variable of central interest of course is the
party of the president. The presidential party coefficient weakens continuously as we use more and
more updated polls. From 22.65 in February (equation 18), it drops in almost linear fashion over the
campaign. By the final increment of time for October
11
If one inserts the lagged vote (the congressional vote from the
prior presidential election year) as an additional variable on the
right-hand side of these equations, its contribution is consistently
insignificant. Past voting adds no predictive power once the polls
and presidential party are taken into account.
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(equation 23), the coefficient is only 21.15 and
barely statistically significant (p 5 .04).12
We illustrate with a series of graphs. Figure 3
plots the Democratic vote share by the poll share at
the different intervals of time for the 16 midterm
At the very end of the campaign, the presidential party effect
appears to be totally absorbed by the generic vote. Controlling for
the final poll in each election year, the estimated effect of
presidential party drops to -0.80, with a p-value of less than .10.
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F IGURE 3 Midterm Congressional Vote by the Generic Vote in the Polls at the Different Time Intervals.
Elections with Democratic Presidents in office are represented by solid dots and solid prediction
lines. Elections with Republican presidents in office are represented by hollow dots and dashed
prediction lines.

-10

0

10

20

Generic Vote (% Dem. minus 50%)

election between 1946 and 2006. In the first frame,
using February polls, one sees that conditional on the
generic vote margin, the president’s party makes a
difference with a gap of about 5 percentage points, as
implied by equation (13). This gap narrows frame by
frame as we use more proximate polling information.
By the last 30 days of the campaign, the prediction
lines for Democratic and Republican presidents
approach convergence.
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Figure 4 offers a further illustration. With
February readings as the ‘‘zero’’ base, it shows the
shifts in the generic polls from February to November.
If the president is a Republican, the Democrats gain
votes. If the president is a Democrat, the Democrats
lose votes. By itself, the presidential party can account
for over half of the variance in the February to
October shift in the generic vote.13
Before we leave Table 4 and the accompanying
figures, one remarkable aspect deserves special discussion. No matter which month the generic polls are
measured, the adjusted R-squared stays about the
same. As the campaign progresses, updating from the
latest generic polls (along with the president’s party)
does not increase one’s ability to predict the vote.
This static predictability suggests that the campaign
brings no new information to the electorate beyond
what is in the equations. The equations change as a
function of the presidential party effect (which
increasingly is absorbed into the generic vote). The
conclusion must be that not only do midterm
campaigns deliver the message to vote for the out13
The presidential party coefficient predicting the February to
October change in the generic polls from the presidential party
is 23.10 (standard error 5 0.75; p5.001. The adjusted R
squared is .52. The intercept is also significant and negative
(23.59) suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the shift in preferences over the midterm campaign tends to favor the
Republicans.

party; this seems to be the only appreciable effect of
the campaign on the national vote.14 If other events
affect the national electoral verdict between February
and November, over the campaign one would see an
increasing ability to predict the election from the
latest polls.15 That this does not happen suggests the
14
The corollary argument is that apart from the growing effect of
the presidential party, the month to month variation in Figures 1
and 2 represents mainly measurement (sampling) error. Indeed,
we have further side-evidence to indicate the variation is mostly
sampling error. For both Democratic and Republican presidencies, we can compare the over-time correlations for the generic
vote by varying the time gap between readings from one to eight
months. The over-time correlations hold steady in the .90 range
regardless of the time gap between readings, consistent with the
result that would obtain if the departures from perfect correlation
are due to sampling error.
15
A useful comparison is the ability to predict the vote at
various stages of the presidential campaign. As can be seen from
Table 4, the root mean squared error (RMSE), is essentially
unchanged—for instance 1.83 in April and 1.84 in October. By
comparison, if one predicts presidential elections by the trial heat
polls in April using the eventual presidential candidates, the
RMSE is well over 4 points. If one predicts the presidential vote
from trial heat polls from the final week of the campaign, the
RMSE is 1.94, which is slightly larger than the prediction error
from the midterm generic vote. (This might not be a fair
comparison, since the presidential readings include the errorfilled 1948 observation. From 1952 onward, the final weeks’ polls
predict the vote with considerable precision. The RMSE is a mere
1.37 based on a .95 adjusted R-squared.) This analysis of
presidential election polls is based on data compiled by the
authors.

balancing in congressional midterms
absence of unaccounted-for events that affect the
vote.16

Summary
This section has analyzed the generic congressional
election poll results over 16 midterms. At our first
measurement in February we find no evidence of
electoral balancing. As the campaign progresses, the
out-party gains in the polls and ultimately at the
ballot box. Although involving only a small percent
of the electorate, this change is nearly universal across
the 16 elections. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
little else contributes to change in the national vote.
At the beginning of the election year, voters’
opinions about the upcoming November election are
unformed and do not reflect much consideration
of the party of the president. Over time, as voters
begin to focus on the upcoming election, they
increasingly take into account the party of the
president. Their increasing attraction to the out party
is the change generated by the midterm campaign.
We attribute this shift in voter sentiment to a
growing consideration of the presidential party and
the fact that policy balance can be restored toward the
center by electing more members of the opposition
party to Congress.

The ‘‘Negative Referendum’’ Theory
Revisited
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T ABLE 5

PREDICTING THE MIDTERM
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE FROM
OCTOBER PRESIDENTIAL
APPROVAL, 16 midterm elections
1946–2006.
Dependent Variable 5
Democratic % of
Two–Party Vote minus 50%
(November)
(30)

(31)

October Presidential
0.16 (0.07)*
Approval (minus
50%) 3 Presidential
Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R)
October Presidential
0.16 (0.07)*
Approval (minus
65.6%) 3 Presidential
Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R)
Current Presidential
22.46 (0.73)** 0.00 (0.73)
Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R)
Intercept
2.73 (0.76)** 2.73 (0.76)**
Adj. R2
.43
.43
Root MSE
2.80
2.80
Note: Equations 30 and 31 are algebraically equivalent.
*p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001

presidential party vote, then it is the public reaction
to the presidential performance rather than the
president’s party affiliation that is the cause.

Presidential Approval and Midterm Loss
As an alternative to our account that the electorate
learns to vote for the opposition party in order to
restore ideological balance, the rival ‘‘negative referendum’’ explanation deserves our consideration.
Does electoral support for the presidential party sag
over the midterm year because voters consider the
policy implications of the presidential party, as we
suggest? Or is the declining support for the presidential party simply due to voters become disillusioned with the presidential party’s performance at
governing, as referendum theory suggests? If presidential support can account for the slide in the

16
Suppose we replace the generic vote on the right-hand side in
Table 4, with its two predictors—current party identification plus
the lagged presidential vote. The result is again a stable R-squared,
averaging .80—slightly higher than in Table 4. With these
alternative equations, the presidential vote coefficient is stable
from the February to October, which makes sense since partisanship is fairly stable over the campaign interval.

To test the referendum explanation, we measure
political conditions using the president’s approval
rating in the Gallup Poll. We wish to understand the
effect of approval on the vote independent of the trial
heat polls. First, we ask, does approval matter? Table 5
models the midterm vote with presidential approval
on the right-hand side. Approval is measured as the
deviation from 50% multiplied by the presidential
party dummy variable (+1 if Democrat, 21 if Republican). Choosing 50% as the benchmark provides
no loss of generality regarding the approval coefficient, which is a statistically significant 0.16.17 Note,
17
Unlike presidential approval, economic performance has no
clear effect on the midterm vote. We tried two economic
measures: (1) the October reading of the consumer sentiment
index and (2) growth in per capita disposable income as
measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Neither variable
(multiplied by presidential party) is significant when added to
our models, with or without approval in the equation.
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PREDICTING THE VOTE FROM PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL, 16 midterm elections 1946–2006
Dependent Variable 5 Democratic % of
Two–Party Vote minus 50% (November)
(32)

February Generic Poll Results
(% Dem. minus 50%)
Change in Approval (Feb. to Oct.). 3
Pres. Party
February Presidential Approval (minus 50) 3
Pres. Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
October Presidential Approval (minus 50) 3
Pres. Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Current Presidential Party (1 5 D, 21 5 R.)
Intercept
Adjusted R squared
RMSE

(33)

0.44 (0.08)***

0.49 (0.10)***

(34)
0.40 (0.10)***

(35)
0.40 (0.07)***

0.04 (0.06)
0.03 (0.04)
0.08 (0.04)
22.65 (0.45)***
21.26 (0.72)
.78
1.72

22.56 (0.47)***
21.47 (0.79)
.78
1.75

22.76 (0.48)***
20.91 (0.88)
.78
1.75

22.79 (0.42)***
0.61 (0.76)
.82
1.59

Note: Poll results and the vote are measured as the Democratic percent of the two-party vote minus 50 percent.
***p , .001

however, that the size of the presidential party
coefficient now becomes conditional on approval at
50%.18
We can manipulate the presidential party coefficient to become larger or smaller by moving the
benchmark up or down from 50%. If we move it up
to 65.6%, we make the presidential party effect
disappear. This is shown in equation (31), which is
algebraically equivalent to equation (30). The value
65.6 is the crude estimate of the threshold of approval
at which the president must obtain for his party to

18
The product of presidential approval (minus 50%) and the
presidential party dummy is an interaction term. The coefficient
and standard error are unaffected by the choice of 50% as the
reference point. We could subtract any amount from the percent
approval and obtain the same result. The choice of reference
point does, however, affect the coefficients for the additive
component, the presidential party. This is why we chose 50%
since it is a useful, seemingly neutral, reference point. We do not
include presidential approval in the equation as an additive term
because we assume that the effect of approval is identical for
Republican and Democratic presidents. The equations of Table 5
are algebraically equivalent to an alternative equation format
where the vote variables are measured as the presidential party
vote rather than the Democratic vote and where the congressional vote is a function of the lagged vote, the presidential
party, and presidential approval. With the alternative format,
our usual presidential party effect would be represented by the
equation intercept (constant) while our usual intercept (with its
trivial value) would be represented by the presidential party
coefficient.

not be disadvantaged at midterm.19 If it were the case
that presidents typically average about 66% approval
at midterm, there would be no advantage for being
the out party.20
The elemental problem with the negative referendum explanation for midterm loss is that as
measured by presidential approval, presidents are
not unusually unpopular during midterm campaigns.
If presidents always wallow at, say, an abnormally low
30% approval at midterm, the negative referendum
explanation would have bite as the underlying cause
for midterm loss. The average presidential approval in
October of midterm years is 54.1%, virtually identical
to the long-term average for all months, 1946–2006

19

Only George W. Bush (2002) and Bill Clinton (1998) bested the
65.6 approval benchmark in October of the midterm year. While
his rough estimate of 65.6% presidential approval is the value
that would neutralize the midterm disadvantage for the presidential party, it does not take into account midterm loss from the
presidential election. Using equations (30) or (31) as a guide,
presidents would need on average around 76% approval to
overcome both the party’s disadvantage at midterm plus the loss
of coattails from the presidential year.
20
With party identification added to the equation, the approval
coefficient plunges to 0.08, half its original value. Evidently, to
the extent approval affects the midterm vote, it is also absorbed
by party identification, which in turn predicts the vote. Since
party identification has been central to our modeling all along, its
absorbing of approval effects constrains the possibilities of
further dynamics involving the president’s approval level

balancing in congressional midterms
(54.7%). Moreover, October approval in midterms
averages 3.1 points higher than in October of the
following year and 2.1 points higher than in October
of the following presidential year (two years ahead).
Even in the nine instances when the president sought
reelection two years later, the president’s approval
averages 1.7 points higher at midterm than later when
seeking reelection (and winning six of nine times).

Presidential Approval and Midterm Year
Electoral Change
Even though as a rule the electorate is not particularly
dissatisfied with the president at midterm, one might
still argue that the electorate tends to punish the
president’s party at midterm because (for some
reason) it sets the performance bar unusually high
at midterm. The obvious challenge to the highthreshold explanation is that it must account for
the fact that the electorate is not inclined to punish
the presidential party at the start of the midterm year.
Could dissatisfaction with the president account for
the persistent decline in support for the president’s
congressional party over the midterm year? There are
two possible mechanisms.
Most obviously, even though the president’s popularity at midterm is no worse than average, it could be
declining from an earlier high at the start of the
midterm year—perhaps the residual from the initial
honeymoon. If so, a demanding electorate could be
satisfied early in the midterm year but then turn sour as
the midterm campaign progresses. Or, even if the
president’s perceived performance does not decline
over the election year, it could become an increasingly
relevant factor because it becomes increasingly salient.
Just as the campaign could teach the electorate to
consider the policy implications of voting for or against
the presidential party, it could teach the electorate to
consider the president’s performance when voting for
Congress. A growing focus on presidential performance
during the midterm campaign would dispose a demanding electorate to become increasingly inclined to
vote against the president.
First, let us consider the evidence regarding the
change in presidential approval from February (when
the poll evidence shows no tendency to punish the
presidential party) to October (when midterm loss is
almost fully incorporated in the polls). Over sixteen
midterms, approval declined in nine cases but increases in the other seven. On average, approval
declines a modest 3.4 percentage points from February to October. Is this sufficient to make a mean-
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ingful difference in support for the presidential
ticket?21
Table 6 shows some relevant regressions. Equation (32) sets the benchmark, repeating equation (13)
(from Table 3) which predicts the Democratic vote
from February polls and the president’s party. Equation (33) adds the February to October shift in
presidential approval times presidential party
(+15Dem, 215Rep). The coefficient of 0.04 for
approval change is small and nonsignificant, and it
hardly detracts from the presidential party effect
(coefficients of 22.65 versus 22.55). Clearly, knowing
in February the upcoming trend in presidential
approval would not help one predict the November
election. This result refutes the idea that declining
presidential approval over the midterm year generates the evolving rejection of the presidential party.22
Still, a possible ‘‘out’’ for the high-threshold
explanation is that, just as with the ‘‘balancing’’
explanation, the electorate does not incorporate
thinking about the president’s job performance until
late in the campaign. To test this idea, equation (34)
regresses the November vote on February generic
polls, the presidential party, and February approval.
The test is whether approval’s entry in the equation
diminishes the presidential party effect. Clearly it
does not. Knowing the president’s standing with the
public in February has no bearing on the midterm
election year trajectory of the vote beyond what the
equation’s other variables reveal; the presidential
party effect holds firm with February approval controlled. Equation (35) substitutes October approval

21
We can also examine the change in the economy over the
midterm year. Over 15 observations of change from quarter 1 to
quarter 3 of midterm years, per capita real income growth rose in
11 years and fell in four. For 14 observations of consumer
sentiment from quarter 1 to quarter 3, sentiment rose in three
but fell in the other 11. The mean change, however, was a trivial 3
out of 200 points.
22
It might seem that a useful test would be to regress change in
the generic vote on change in presidential approval. A problem
arises, however, with the two change variables measured for the
same time interval; given that the two measures share some of the
same respondents, they share sampling error. (For example, an
unusually Republican sample at time 2 would have an artificially
pro-Republican generic vote and an artificially pro-Republican
approval score.) Comparing October to February readings, the
regression of change in the generic vote on the change in
approval is 0.24, with a significant .01 p-values. However, this
correlation suffers from the correlated errors problem mentioned
above. A better test is to relate change in the generic vote from
April to October on change in approval from February to August.
Here, the two measures are from different sets of time points,
thus not sharing sampling error. The regression coefficient now
drops to 0.06, with a p-value of .43.
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for February approval. Again the coefficient is not
significant and there is no impact on the other terms
of the equation. Knowing in February of the midterm
year how the president will stand with the public in
October has little bearing on the trajectory of
preferences over the campaign. As before, the key
predictor is the party of the president.23
The remarkable aspect of equation (35) is that
the effect of presidential approval as measured in
October is already mainly absorbed by polls as
measured in February. The president’s standing in
the polls does not change much over the midterm
year and when it does change it is not clear that it
matters much since the vote, apart from the impact
of the presidential party, is fairly well set by February.
The one change in every midterm campaign is the
growing negative impact of the president’s party.

Summary
This section has tested the hypothesis that the
presidential party’s negative trajectory at midterm is
due to voters reacting negatively to the president’s
performance. While the national vote is affected by
the president’s approval rating, presidents are not
unusually unpopular at midterm. And the pattern of
decline in presidential popularity over the midterm
year is too small and ragged to account for the
negative shift. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the president’s popularity becomes a more salient
factor over the midterm campaign. In short, we find
no empirical support for the idea that the midterm
sag in electoral fortunes of congressional candidates
of the presidential party is the product of a negative
referendum on presidential performance.

23

As a further test, we can predict the ‘‘vote’’ in generic polls,
February to October, and observe whether the coefficient for
approval changes. When the equations of Table 2 are replicated
with the addition of either current or lagged (one month)
presidential approval, the coefficients are always small and not
significant. Seemingly, the effects of presidential approval are
largely absorbed by current party identification. The approval
coefficients do not increase with time. If anything the coefficients
decline over time. For instance, using current approval, the trivial
coefficients are 0.06 for February and 20.03 for October. When
party identification is omitted from these equations, the coefficient for current approval declines from a significant 0.19 in
February to a nonsignificant 0.13 in October. Using lagged
approval the decline is from 0.22 (February) to 0.10 (October).
Clearly there is no evidence that generic poll respondents
increasingly take their evaluations of the president into account
when casting hypothetical congressional ballots.

Discussion and Conclusion
The pattern of midterm loss for the presidential party
is a function of an advantage for the winning party in
the presidential election followed by an advantage for
the losing party at the subsequent midterm. While
much attention has focused on the former, the latter
is actually of greater magnitude, as parties typically
gain more at midterm by losing the presidential
election than they gain from winning the presidency.
This article has examined trends in partisan vote
preference over the sixteen most recent midterm
years. We do not challenge the presence of a
presidential year surge or coattails and their withdrawal as part of the explanation. Our search has
been for the component of midterm loss that results
from the behavior of voters in the midterm year.
The main contribution of our research derives
from the use of ‘‘generic ballot’’ polls for midterm
congressional elections. Early in the campaign, voters
tell pollsters their party choice without much thought
beyond the immediate political environment. The
electorate’s vote trajectory over the course of the
campaign that follows is toward the out party, as if
the value of balance becomes clear once the voters
focus on their November decision.24
Our results do not mean that the midterm vote is
unaffected by the president’s popularity, as we have
shown that it is. They do mean that the effects are
already largely absorbed in the generic polls as of
February of the election year. Between February and
Election Day, the presidential party’s vote strength
almost always declines, and the degree of decline is
unrelated to the public’s evaluation of the president.
Clearly, during the midterm election year, the electorate shifts away from the presidential party in its
vote choice for reasons that have nothing to do with
the electorate’s attitudes toward the president. By
default, this is balancing: the electorate votes against
the presidential party to give more power to the other
party, but does not incorporate this motivation in its
thinking until Election Day approaches.
The alternative interpretation of our findings is
that midterm voters simply turn against the incumbent president as if for no reason at all. Such a bias
against the sitting president is noticeably absent at
other times during the election cycle, even in the

24

The results are at least as strong if not stronger if we substitute
the two-party division of House seats for the two-party vote in
the various equations. The results also hold for the partisan
division of Senate seats up for election.

balancing in congressional midterms
Spring of the midterm year itself. We thus settle on a
purpose-driven explanation: a desire to balance the
policies of the president’s party. To some, this idea
asks too much of ordinary voters. But, all that is
required is that some voters know and care about the
parties’ policy tendencies and know which party
holds the presidency.25
We end up with two separate but compatible
explanations for midterm loss. In presidential years,
the winning presidential party is advantaged in the
congressional elections, due to the surge/coattails
phenomenon. This advantage is withdrawn in midterm election years. As we have examined here, at
midterm the presidential party is disadvantaged, as
the electorate shifts its preferences to the out party.
Together these two components generate the regularity of midterm loss.
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